Case Notes by Brown, Nancy G. et al.
BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS-THE EXPANSION OF THE RIGHTS OF ILLEGITI-
MATES--Franklin v. Julian, 30 Ohio St. 2d 228, 283 N.E.2d 813 (1972).
I. ILLEGITIMATES' RIGHT TO SUPPORT
The Ohio supreme court in Franklin v. Julian' expanded the class of women
who, pursuant to § 3111.01 of the Ohio Revised Code,2 may bring a bastardy pro-
ceeding against the father of an illegitimate child to recover personal support, reim-
bursement for the expense of pregnancy and childbirth, and child support. Section
3111.01 begins: "When an unmarried woman, who has been delivered of, or is
pregnant with, a bastard child, makes a complaint ... ."S The statute does not in-
dicate whether the availability of a bastardy proceeding is restricted to a woman un-
married at the time of conception, to a woman unmarried at birth, or merely -re-
quires that she be unmarried when she files the complaint.4 For more than one
hundred years, litigants in Ohio courts have disputed this statutory requirement of
§ 3111.01. Lower courts have frequently disagreed as to the relevant time period in-
tended by the legislature when it used the word "unmarried." However, the deci-
sions more often than not have construed the meaning of "unmarried" so as t6
narrow the class of women who are eligible to institute bastardy proceedings.
5
In Franklin, the Ohio supreme court announced that "unmarried" refers only
to the mother's marital status when she files the complaint and does not preclude
bastardy actions on the part of women who were married at the time of conception
or birth. Moreover, the court determined that despite the unavailability of bastardy
proceedings to women married at the filing date, an illegitimate child of such a wom-
an may bring an action in his own name to recover support from his father based
on a common law duty of support.
The decision in Franklin v. Julian resulted from the consideration of two sepa-
rate bastardy complaints. 6 The first case involved a woman, divorced at the time
of filing, who had been married at conception and birth. The supreme court ac-
knowledged that its prior rulings would deny such a woman any relief under §
3111.01, but found that nothing in the language of the statute permits such a re-
sult. The court attributed the previous restrictive reading of the word "unmarried"
to centuries of prejudice against the adulterine bastard.7
In the second action, the unwed mother of two illegitimate children subsequent-
ly married a man other than the putative father and, while married, filed a com-
plaint under § 3111.01. The court opined that such a woman may not benefit
130 Ohio St. 2d 228, 283 N.E.2d 813 (1972).
2 OmoREv. CODE ANN. § 3111.01 (Page 1972).
RId.
4 37 U. Cn,. L. REv. 594 (1968).
5 See, e.g., State ex rel. Hoerres v. Wilkoff, 157 Ohio St. 286, 105 N.E.2d 39 (1952); Miller
v. Anderson, 43 Ohio St. 473, 3 N.E. 605 (1885); Haworth v. Gill, 30 Ohio St. 627 (1876);
Beam v. Ray, 111 Ohio App. 341, 170 N.E.2d 844 (Montgomery County 1960); State ex rel.
Fisher v. McKinney, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 190, 85 N.E.2d 562 (Ct. App. Montgomery County 1949);
Sullivan v. Wilkoff, 63 Ohio App. 269, 26 N..E2d 460 (Mahoning County 1939); State ex rel.
v. Cregar, 8 Ohio App. 138 (Clark County 1918). But see, Roth v. Jacobs, 21 Ohio St. 646
(1871); State ex rel. Sprungle v. Bard, 59 Ohio L. Abs. 129, 98 N.X.2d 63 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga
County 1950); Kirkbride v. Eschbaugh, 77 Ohio L. Abs. 33, 147 N.E.2d 676 (Juv. Ct. Noble
County 1957).
6 Both cases were dismissed by the lower courts. On appeal the court of appeals affirmed in
the fifst case and reversed and remanded for trial under the bastardy statute in the second case.
30 Ohio St. 2d at 229,283 N.E.2d at 814 (1972).
7 Id. at 230-31, 283 N.E.2d at 814-15.
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from § 3111.01 inasmuch as the statute provides for support for the mother,8 which
support the married mother can obtain from her present husband. However, not-
withstanding the unavailability of the statutory bastardy proceedings, the illegiti-
mate child is not deprived of the right to claim support from his father.
In determining that the illegitimate has a right to support outside the Bastardy
Act, the court directed its attention to the existence of various criminal statutes
which provide for prosecution of a father who fails to support his child, whether
the child be legitimate or illegitimate.9 These criminal statutes are intended to com-
pel the father to provide support and do not require that paternity be first estab-
lished in a bastardy proceeding. Further, the court noted that it has had no diffi-
culty awarding support for legitimate children without reference to explicit statutes,
usually in the aftermath of a divorce or separation. If such a non-statutory right
of support is available to the legitimate child, equal protection would require that
it be available to the illegitimate as well.10
In granting to the illegitimate a non-statutory right to support, the court, in a
footnote, overruled Baston v. Sears." Baston had been decided only four years
earlier and had established that an illegitimate child could not bring a declaratoryjudgment action to establish a right to receive support. 12 The Baston court, reject-
ing the application of equal protection arguments to such a claim, ruled that an il-
legitimate does not have a non-statutory right to support.
The holding in Baston was probably the result of an erroneous reading of Levy
v. Louisiana,'8 a United States Supreme Court decision which antedated the Baston
decision by only a few months.14 The Supreme Court in Levy held that to bar an
illegitimate from recovering for the wrongful death of his mother under Louisiana's
wrongful death statute constituted discrimination forbidden to the states by the
fourteenth amendment. The Court emphasized that an illegitimate should not be
denied rights merely because of the accident of his birth; that the fact of illegiti-
macy has no bearing on the injury suffered by the illegitimate because of the death
of his mother; and noted the significance of the mother-child relationship. The
majority opinion in Baston concentrated on the latter aspect of the opinion and
dismissed Levy in a footnote as inapplicable: "The rights announced in Levy were
8 0111o REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.17 (Page 1972).
9 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.42 (Page 1968); § 2903.08 (Page 1954); § 3113.01
(Page 1972).
10 30 Ohio St. 2d at 234-35,283 N.E.2d at 816-17.
1 Id. at 234 n.5, 283 N.E.2d at 817 n.5.
12 15 Ohio St. 2d 166, 239 N.E.2d 62 (1968). In overruling Baston the Franklin court did
not determine whether an illegitimate child may establish the right to support in a declaratoryjudgment proceeding. Two lower court decisions prior to Baston had permitted an illegitimate
child to bring such an action. See Wilson v. Early, 23 Ohio Op. 2d 440, 192 N.E.2d 119 (C.P.
Cuyahoga County 1963) and Maiden v. Maiden, 78 Ohio L. Abs. 551, 153 N.E.2d 460 (C.P.
Montgomefy County 1955); Contra, In re Paternity, 4 Ohio Misc. 193, 211 N.E.2d 894 (C.P.
Hamilton County 1965). Following Franklin's recognition of a non-statutory right to support,
the question of the availability of a declaratory judgment proceeding is probably of little prac-
tical significance.
13 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
14 Justices O'Neill, Herbert and Schneider dissented in Baston on the basis of Levy's equal pro-
tection argument. Baston v. Sears, 15 Ohio St. 2d 166, 169-71, 239 N.E.2d 62, 64-65 (1968).
Likewise several other courts which considered the rights of an illegitimate shortly after Levy
concluded that the illegitimate child should be accorded the same rights as the legitimate child.
See, H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW & SOCIAL POLICY 70-81 (1971).
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based on the intimate, familial relationship which exists between a mother and her
child, whether the child is legitimate or illegitimate."' 5
By 1972 the Supreme Court had made it abundantly dear that Levy must be given
a very broad reading. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.'8 the Supreme
Court struck down a Louisiana statute which gave an unacknowledged illegitimate
child rights inferior to those of a legitimate child under the state's workmen's com-
pensation law. Inasmuch as a dependent illegitimate child might suffer as seriously
as a legitimate child due to his father's death, the fact of illegitimacy alone was
deemed to bear no substantial relationship to the purported purpose of the work-
men's compensation law.
The Ohio supreme court in Franklin recognized that the illegitimate child must
be accorded a right equal to that of the legitimate child to recover support from his
father. However, as an aftermath to the court's decision, there remains a distinc-
tion between classes of women who bear illegitimate children. Only an unmarried
woman may recover support for herself and the expenses of pregnancy and child-
birth pursuant to § 3111.01. On the other hand, the woman who is married to one
other than the putative father at the time of filing receives no such benefits from the
putative father, notwithstanding that such a woman may have borne pregnancy and
childbirth expenses entirely by herself.
The Franklin court justified its denial of any benefits to the married mother
with the statement: "Having voluntarily abandoned the single state and chosen to
marry one upon whom she may depend for maintenance other than the putative
father of her children, her claim for her own support does not merit our further at-
tention."' 7 This statement disregards the fact that such a woman can look only to
the putative father to recover pregnancy and childbirth expenses incurred before
marriage; certainly her husband is not legally responsible for such expenses. By
virtue of the court's interpretation of § 3111.01, a woman's recovery depends on the
fortuitous circumstance of whether she does or does not file a bastardy action be-
fore marriage.
The United States Supreme Court has twice declared unconstitutional state laws
which discriminated against the parents of illegitimate children. In Glona v. Amer-
ican Guarantee & Liability Co.,18 the Court held that Louisiana could not deny
a mother the right to recover for the death of her illegitimate child under Louisi-
ana's wrongful death statute. Again in Stanley v. Illinois,19 the Court struck down
an Illinois law which automatically denied the father of an illegitimate child cus-
tody of the child unless he successfully maintained an adoption proceeding. The
Court held that the father of an illegitimate child had the same right to custody as
did the father of a legitimate child and, therefore, must be awarded custody unless
he was legally determined to be an unfit parent. The equal protection clause, as
construed in Glona and Stanley, mandates that state law extend the same rights
and benefits to the parent of an illegitimate as to the parent of a legitimate child.
The Franklin court's reading of § 3111.01, to the extent that it grants one class of
women who bear an illegitimate child rights inferior to mothers of legitimate chil-
dren, constitutes a denial of equal protection. The fact that the discrimination does
not extend to all mothers of illegitimates, but only to one class, does not make the
discrimination any less objectionable.
15 Baston v. Sears, 15 Ohio St. 2d 166, 168 n., 239 N.E.2d 62, 63 n.
16 402 U.S. 164 (1972).
17 30 Ohio St. 2d at 232-33, 283 N.E.2d at 816 (emphasis supplied).
18391 U.S. 73 (1968).
19 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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H. OTHER RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATES
Although Franklin v. Julian is not responsive to the potential problem of dis-
crimination against the illegitimate's mother, it does provide the illegitimate child
with a right to support against his father comparable to that possessed by the legiti-
mate child. Other areas of Ohio law require reconsideration in light of recent
United States Supreme Court rulings. Clearly the court's reading of the equal pro-
tection clause may not be limited to the support area. "[T]he Equal Protection
Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth
where ... the classification is justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or
otherwise." 20
Three months after Franklin one Ohio appeals court concluded that the word
"children" in a clause in an insurance contract providing for payment of its proceeds
should be read to include illegitimate as well as legitimate children. 21 The Cuya-
hoga County Court of Appeals reasoned that an insurance policy essentially em-
bodies a contractual arrangement; therefore the choice of a beneficiary, even when
the beneficiary is unnamed, should not be controlled by the laws of descent and dis-
tribution. Rather, the court cited Franklin and Weber and announced:
The significance of these decisions goes well beyond their narrow hold-
ings. They articulate what should have been undisputed-that even illegit-
imate children are entitled to protection against those laws whose discrimi-
natory purpose, or effect, is irrational and without significant relationship
to a valid state interest.22
Equally vulnerable are Ohio's statutes pertaining to an illegitimate's right to
recover under the state's workmen's compensation law.2 3 The word "children" in §
4123.59, which enumerates the eligible beneficiaries of workmen's compensation,
was twice interpreted by the Ohio supreme court (Staker v. Industrial Commission
of Ohio24 and Miller v. Industrial Commission of Ohio25) to refer to legitimate
children only. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Weber prohibited
such a construction of Louisiana's workmen's compensation law. Consequently, the
Ohio courts should no longer interpret the workmen's compensation law on the basis
of Staker and Miller.
Similarly, Ohio courts should not rely in the future on earlier decisions as to
the right of an illegitimate child to recover under the state's wrongful death statute.
The statute was construed in 1859 to permit an illegitimate child to recover for the
death of its mother,2 6 thus complying with Levy. However, Ohio courts have barred
recovery to a child born out of wedlock for the wrongful death of his father,2 a
position which simply cannot be squared with the illegitimate child's right to de-
mand support from his father.
Finally, Ohio's provisions for the determination of who shall have the custody
of the illegitimate child are potentially vulnerable to constitutional attack. Ac-
cording to Ohio's statutes, the father and mother of a legitimate child have equal
20 Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176 (1972).21 Butcher v. Pollard, 32 Ohio App. 2d 1, 288 N.E.2d 204 (Cuyahoga County 1972).
2 2 Id. at 14, 288 N.E.2d at 212.
2 3 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.59 (Page 1965).
24 127 Ohio St. 13, 186 N.E. 616 (1933).
25 165 Ohio St. 584, 138 N.E.2d 672 (1956).
2 6 Muhl's Adm'r v. Michigan So. R.R., 10 Ohio St. 272 (1859).
2 7 Bonewit v. Weber, 95 Ohio App. 428, 120 N.E.2d 738 (Summit County 1952).
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rights to his custody. And when a custody struggle develops, usually in the con-
text of divorce, a court is supposed to determine custody on the basis of the best
interests of the child.28 Only the mother, on the other hand, is entitled to the
custody of her illegitimate childP absent a finding that she is an unfit mother or
has neglected or abandoned her child.3° It seems illogical that the determination of
which parent is entitled to custody should not be made on the basis of the best in-
terests of the child, regardless of whether or not the parents were married at the
child's birth. The present treatment of illegitimates is potentially injurious both
to the father who seeks custody and to the child who might be better off in his
father's custody.
Admittedly it may ensue that only infrequently will the father of an illegitimate
child actually seek custody, but the fact that the divorced father may not typically
seek custody has not been considered a reason for denying him all rights to custody
when the mother is a fit parent. Nor does it seem reasonable to support this dis-
crimination against the illegitimate child and his father on the basis that the state
has a proper interest in protecting and encouraging marriage and that, by requiring
the father to marry the child's mother to obtain custody, marriage will be encour-
aged. It could as well be argued that by automatically denying the divorced father
custody of his children, he will be less likely to seek divorce. Neither approach
seems very likely to encourage marriage or to encourage the sort of social relation-
ships which it is presumed the state would like to foster. Rather, the different pro-
cedures pertaining to custody of the legitimate and illegitimate child appear to con-
stitute the sort of arbitrary discrimination which the Supreme Court in Stanley held
to be a violation of equal protection.
A similar analysis of Ohio's intestacy statutes would divulge considerable dis-
crimination against the illegitimate. However, in the area of intestacy law, the
United States Supreme Court has upheld disparate treatment of illegitimates. In
Labine v. Vincent3l the Court in a five-to-four opinion upheld the constitutionality
of Louisiana's intestacy statutes which prevented an acknowledged illegitimate child
from sharing in his father's estate if the father died intestate. This rather startling
departure from the general thrust of the Court's decisions expanding the rights of
illegitimates does not seem to be attributable to any change in Court membership
or reversal of direction, since it antedates Weber and Stanley. Perhaps the best ex-
planation for Labine is that which was provided by Justice Powell in Weber: "La-
bine reflected, in major part, the traditional deference to a State's prerogative to
regulate the disposition at death of property within its borders."a
'
III. CONCLUSION
Franklin v. Julian heralds the realization by the Ohio supreme court of the
import of the Supreme Court decisions expanding the rights of illegitimate chil-
dren. The method adopted by the Ohio court to insure that the illegitimate child
has a right to support from his father shows an unfortunate disregard of the rights
of the illegitimate child's mother. Nevertheless, the language of the decision is
2 8Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.08 (Page 1968); § 3109.03 (Page 1972); and § 3109.04
(Page 1972).
29 In re Gutman, 22 Ohio App. 2d 125, 259 N.E.2d 128 (Hamilton County 1969); In re
Gary, 112 Ohio App. 331, 167 N.E.2d 509 (Cuyahoga County 1960).
30 In re Tilton, 161 Ohio St. 571, 120 N.E.2d 445 (1954).
31401 U.S. 532 (1971).
82 Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sufety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 170 (1972).
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such that it can be assumed that the Ohio supreme court is fully cognizant of the
scope of the Supreme Court decisions and of their nearly total rejection of illegiti-
macy as a proper basis for discrimination. It should follow that the Ohio courts
will be receptive to arguments seeking the elimination of the discrimination against
the illegitimate child and against his parents which exists at present both in Ohio
statutes and as a result of judicial construction.
Nancy G. Brown*
PERPETUITIES-APPLICATION OF THE REVISED OHIO PERPETUITIES STATUTE-
Dollar Federal Savings Trust Co. v. First National Bank, - Ohio Misc.
285 N.E.2d 768 (C.P., Probate Div., Mahoning Co. 1972).
In 1967 the Ohio legislature undertook a major revision of the Ohio perpetuities
law. The result of this effort was a statute that incorporated the common law rule,
supplemented by two key amendments.' Of principal significance, "the possibilities
test for determining the validity of contingent future interests [was] abandoned, and
an actualities or wait and see principle [wasi adopted, together with a cy pres or
reformation component." 2 Of course, the revisions raised questions that had to await
judicial determination. To what interests would the revised statute apply? How
would cy pres and "wait and see" be reconciled? Should "wait and see" be applied
before cy pres? Finally, an important question was created by paragraph D of the
new statute.3 Under the traditional rule, "the validity of an appointment made by the
exercise of a general testamentary or a special power is determined by reading back
or interpolating the appointment into the instrument creating the power and comput-
Editorial Associate, Richard W. Avery.
OHIo REV. CODE § 2131.08 (Page Supp. 1967).
(A) No interest in real or personal property shall be good unless it must vest, if
at all, not later than twenty-one years after a life or lives in being at the creation of the
interest. All estates given in tail, by deed or will, in lands of tenements lying within
this state, shall be and remain an absolute estate in fee simple to the issue of the first
donee in tail. It is the intent by adoption of this section to make effective in Ohio
what is generally known as the common law rule against perpetuities, except as set
forth in paragraphs (B) and (C) of this section.
(B) For the purposes of this section, the time of the creation of an interest in real
or personal property subject to a power reserved by the grantor to revoke or termintte
such interest shall be the time at which such reserved power expires, either by reason
of the death of the grantor or by release of the power or otherwise.
(C) Any interest in real or personal property which would violate the rule against
perpetuities, under paragraph (A) hereof, shall be reformed, within the limits of the
rule, to approximate most closely the intention of the creator of the interest. In de-
termining whether an interest would violate the rule and in feforming an interest the
period of perpetuities shall be measured by actual rather than possible events.
(D) Paragraphs (B) and (C) of this section shall be effective with respect to
interests in real or personal propef'y created by wills of decedents dying after December
31, 1967, and with respect to interests in real or personal property created by inter
vivos instruments executed on or before December 31, 1967, which by reason of para-
graph (B) of this section will be treated as interests created after December 31, 1967.
An interest in real or personal property which comes into effect through the exercise
of a power of appointment shall'be regarded as having been created by the instru-
ment exercising the power rather than the instrument which created the power.
2 Lynn, The Ohio Perpetuities Reform Statute, 29 OHIO ST. I.J. 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as Perpetuities Reform].
3 OHIo REv. CODE § 431.08(D) (Page Supp. 1967).
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ing the perpetuities period from the time the power is created." 4 Paragraph D made
it at least arguable "that an interest arising under the exercise of a power of appoint.
ment is henceforth to be treated for perpetuities purposes as created by the instru-
ment which exercises the power rather than the interest which creates the power." 5
In Dollar Savings and Trust Co. v. First National Bank,6 the first case litigated
under the revised perpetuities statute, the court answered many of the questions
raised by the revisions. The perpetuities issues in the case involved three separate
documents: the will of Grace Tod Arrel, the will of her daughter, Frances Arrel
Parson, and a trust indenture executed by Mrs. Parson.
Grace Tod Arrel died testate in 1921. Her will provided that one-fourth of
her residuary estate was to be held in trust for the benefit of her daughter, Frances,
and upon the death of Frances:
[Tjhe principal of said Trust Fund shall be distributed among her legal
heirs in such a manner as it would be distributable, had she at her death,
been the absolute owner thereof, in her own right. It is hereby provided,
however, that my said daughter shall have power to direct by her will, the
manner in which said Trust Fund shall be distributed and the persons to
whom the same shall go.7
Frances Arrel Parson died testate in 1969, but her will contained no specific refer-
ence to the power of appointment granted her by the above-quoted provision in her
mother's will. Instead, the will contained the following general provision concern-
ing powers of appointment:
All the rest and residue of my property and estate of every kind and nature
of which I shall die seized or possessed or ... over which I may have any
power of appointment at the time of my death, I devise and bequeath to
the then Trustee or Trustees under a certain Indenture of Trust heretofore
executed by me on the 7th day of September, 1967 .... &
According to the court in Dollar Savings,0 the trust indenture executed by Frances
Arrel Parson and referred to in her will made the following disposition of the trust
assets:
[aifter the settlor's death, certain payments are to be made... and ... the
remainder of the trust property is to be held for the benefit of the settlor's
children for their lives. Each child is given a testamentary power of ap-
pointment "to or among" his own issue. In default of such appointment by
any child, his share is to be retained in trust for the benefit of his issue,
or the issue of the settlor, by representation, until each of such issue reaches
the age of 21 years, at which time he is to receive his share of the principal,
but in no event later than 21 years after the death of the last to die of the
settlor and all her issue living at the date of the execution of the trust inden-
ture.' 0
The children of Mrs. Parson contended that they were entitled to the Arrel trust
4 Perpetuities Reform, supra note 2, at 6.
Id. at 1.
0- Ohio Misc. - , 285 N.E.2d 768 (C.P., Probate Div., Mahoning Co. 1972).
7Id. at-, 285 N.E.2d at 770.
81d. at--, 285 N.E.2d at 771.
9 The terms of the trust agreement were paraphrased by the court.
10 - Ohio Misc. at-, 285 N.X.2d at 771.
[Vol. 34
CASE NOTES
assets outright," and Dollar Savings and Trust Co., testamentary trustee of the trust,
brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment and instructions concerning the
will of Grade Tod Arrel. The arguments advanced by the children in support of
their contention were: (1) their mother did not intend to exercise the Arrel power
of appointment in favor of the trust she executed in 1967; and (2) even if she did
intend to so exercise the Arrel power, such an exercise would be in violation of the
perpetuities statute. The court in Dollar Savings rejected the argument that Mrs.
Parsons did not intend to exercise the Arrel power of appointment in her will.
The court then turned its attention to the proper interpretation of the revised per-
petuities statute. However, to put the case in the proper perspective it is helpful to
consider what the result in the case would have been prior to the statutory revisions.
Before the 1967 amendments, the validity of the exercise of a general testamen-
tary power of appointment would have been measured as of the time of the creation
of the power and would have been judged according to the possibilities existing at
that time. In the principal case, the date of creation of the power was 1921, and in
1921 it was possible for Mrs. Parson to have more children; therefore, the exercise
of the power of appointment might result in a gift to an unborn child of an unborn
child and would be in violation of the perpetuities period of "lives in being plus 21
years." This would have been true even though at the time the power of appoint-
ment was exercised, 1969, it was certain that this possibility had not occurred. Be-
fore 1967 the possibilities as of the time of the creation of the power rather than the
actualities as of the time of its exercise controlled the outcome. In contrast, the
1967 amendments made it possible for the court in Dollar Savings to hold that the
power of appointment given Mrs. Parson could be reformed' 2 to comply with the
provisions of the Ohio perpetuities statute.' 3
The discussion of the perpetuities statute in Dollar Savings dealt primarily with
whether the 1967 revisions applied even though the power of appointment was
created in 1921, and, if so, in what manner the "wait and see" and cy pres provi-
sions affected the validity of the exercise of the power of appointment. The court
held the application of the 1967 amendments to the facts of the case "dear and un-
escapable" for two reasons. First, paragraph D of the revised statute specifically
applies the amendments to interests created by wills of decedents dying after Decem-
ber 31, 1967.14 Second, the Ohio constitutional prohibition against retroactive
statutes does not bar the application of the amendments to a power of appointment
created in 1921.
The retroactivity provision in the Ohio constitution does not appear to be a
genuine problem with respect to perpetuities statutes; in fact, it is an issue which has
rarely been raised. 15 Additionally, the perpetuities reform statute provides explic-
itly that the operation of the statute is prospective only, probably because the Ohio
"The assets that the children sought were those left in trust for their mother, Frances Arrel
Parson, by her mother, Grace Tod Arrel, for life with a powet of appointment.
12 - Ohio Misc. at -, 285 N.E.2d at 779.
Is The author assumes for purposes of this article that the Ohio rule of perpetuities is ap-
plicable. For a discussion of the conflict of laws problems involved in the principal case see
- Ohio Misc. at -, 285 N.E.2d at 776-77 which discusses the issue in this case. J.H.C.
MORIuS & W. B. LEAC-, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 20-26 (2d ed. 1962) discusses the
problem and seems to agree with the court's conclusion.
14 OHIO REv. CODE § 2131.08(D) (Page Supp. 1967).
15 For a limited discussion of the problems involved, see Perpetuities Reform, supra note 1,
at 7. See also Note, The Rule Against Perpetuities-Statutory Reform, 20 CASE WE-S. RES.
L. REv. 295, 306 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Reform); J. DUKEMnIER, JR., PER-
PETUrIn§ LAW IN ACTION 38-39 (1962).
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constitution provides that "Itthe general assembly shall have no power to pass retro-
active laws .... "11 The prospectivity clause of this particular enactment may also
have been included because it facilitates the interpretation of the perpetuities statute
by freeing courts from wrestling with the problems of when a power of appoint-
ment should be considered to have been created.' 7 Although it is not dear from
the opinion, the argument was probably made in this case that application of the
1967 amended statute to a power of appointment created in 1921 prevented the
children from taking the property outright by the rules of intestacy, since the rules
of intestacy would have been applied if the exercise of the power of appointment
had failed. However, the court noted that the general definition of a retrospective
law is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws,
or one which creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty with respect to
transactions already past.' 8 Rights stemming from a power of appointment cannot
vest until the power is exercised, and in this case it was the exercise of the power
which was challenged. Judge Henderson accurately pointed out that a statute is
not regarded as operating retroactively merely because it relates to antecedent events,
or draws upon antecedent facts for its operation.19 Rather, the relevant factor is
the degree to which the statute changes the legal incidents or effects of a claim
arising from a pre-statute event.20 In the principal case the pre-statute event was the
creation of a power of appointment by Grace Tod Arrel in 1921. If anything,
the "wait and see" provision of the perpetuities statute relaxes the determination of
whether the power has properly been exercised by allowing the court in most in-
stances to determine whether or not a violation actually occurs. Application of the
cy pres or reformation provision may save the power from being legally terminated.
The retroactivity provision of the Ohio constitution has been held not to apply to
legislative enactments which are remedial in nature because a statute which is re-
medial in its operation on existing rights, obligations, duties, or interests is not within
the class of mischiefs the provision sought to prohibit.21 In light of this interpre-
tation, it is clear that the court was correct in holding that the 1967 amendments
as applied in this case were not "retroactive legislation."
As noted above, the 1967 amendments were specifically made applicable to in-
terests created by wills of decedents dying after December 31, 1967. An interest
derived from a power of appointment is specifically declared by these amend-
ments to have been created by the instrument exercising the power and not by the
instrument creating the power for purposes of determining whether the statute ap-
plies. 22 However, this does not resolve the question of whether the substantive
rule of the statute, "lives in being plus 21 years," is to be applied as of the time of
creation or as of the time of exercise of a power of appointment. The common
16 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 28. Note, Retroactive Application of Ohio Statutes, 30 OHIO ST.
L.J. 401 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Retroactive Application].
17 In Statutory Reform, supra note 15, at 306, the author suggests that in deciding cases not
expressly covered by the new statute, courts should nonetheless adopt the new policy as a matter
of common law.
1 8 
- Ohio Misc. at -, 285 N.E.2d at 777.
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., Retroactive Application, supra note 16; Hochman, The Supreme Court and the
Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HAav. L. REv. 692 (1960); Note, Retroactive
Laws and Vested Rights, 5 Tnx. L REV. 231 (1927).
2 1 Smith v. New York C f'al R.R., 122 Ohio St. 45, 48-49, 170 N.E. 637, 638 (1930).
22 - Ohio Misc. at - --, 285 N.E.2d at 778. Leach, Perpetuities Reform by Legisla-
tion, 70 LQ. REv. 478, 490 (1954), criticizes such attempts to define the beginning of the per-
petuity period because the resulting statutes are too lengthy and complex.
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law rule against perpetuities measured the validity of the interests created by powers
of appointment from the time of the creation of the power and not from its exer-
cise.23 The question was raised at the time the amendments were passed whether
the last sentence of paragraph D, which specifically deals with powers of appoint-
ment, was intended to effect a change in the substantive law of Ohio which, prior to
the 1967 amendments, was the same as the common law.24 The court in Dollar
Savings held that the last sentence of paragraph D was intended only to establish
the effective date of the amendments in relationship to various interests and was not
intended to effect any substantive changes in the law. The holding is based on the
theory that paragraph A reaffirms the common law with the express exceptions of
paragraphs B and C. The absence of the word "time" in the last sentence of
paragraph D, plus the fact that the rest of the paragraph discusses the effective date
of enforcement of the amendments, indicates a lack of legislative intent to change
the common law rule as to the time of judging appointments made through the
exercise of powers of appointment. The significance of this legislative drafting is
especially marked when compared with the language of paragraph B which was in
tended to clarify time with respect to revocable inter vivos trusts.2 5
It has been argued that the language of paragraph D should be broadly inter-
preted to make possible the creation of a family trust in perpetuity through a suc-
cession of powers of appointment, 26 but this would defeat the basic policy of the
perpetuities statute by preventing free alienation of the property indefinitely.27 Ad-
ditionally, there are adverse tax consequences for the donee of a general testamen-
tary power, who, in the exercise of the power, creates another power of appoint-
ment.23 The interpretation given paragraph D by the court in Dollar Savings seems
to be a reasonable one.
The relationship between the "wait and see" and cy pres amendments29 was also
considered in Dollar Savings. As at common law the rule against perpetuities applies
to a power of appointment itself, as well as to an appointment made in exercise of
the power. Under the present statutory provisions, the interest still must vest, if
at all, within the period "lives in being plus 21 years." However the court has
more time to determine whether or not vesting has in fact occurred.30 For example,
under the common law, the life in being in the principal case would have been
that of the daughter, Frances Arrel Parson, because at the time of her mother's death
it could not be said that the daughter would not have more children. However, it
23 Cleveland Trust Co. v. McQuade, 106 Ohio App. 237, 142 N.E.2d 249 (Cuyahoga Co.
1957).
24 Perpetuities Reform, supra note 2, at 2; Statutory Reform, supra note 15, at 304; Wachs,
New Perpetuities Legislation, VI Orno ST. BAR Assoc. SERV. LETrER 4 (1967).
25 - Ohio Misc. at-- , 285 N.E.2d at 777.
26 Statutory Reform, supra note 15, at 304.
2 7 See, e.g., Waterbury, Some Further Thoughts on Perpetuities Reform, 42 MINN. L. REV.
41, 45 (1957) for a discussion of the alienability of property held by trust funds. Although the
property in the principal case was not personalty, there still may be this problem. The money
will be committed to conservative capital investments and may not tie in with the investment
and consumption needs of the economy. However those who receive the money may continue
these same conservative investments. Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. REV.
707, 724 (1955); Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638 (1938).
28 See Further Trends in Perpetuities, REAL PuOP. PROB. & TR. J. 333, 337 (Fall, 1970), for
a discussion of the Wisconsin statute and the tax problem. See also Statutory Reforms, supra
note 15, at 305 for a discussion of the Delaware statute and its tax consequences as reflected in
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(b).
29 Omo REv. CODE § 2131.08 (Page Supp. 1967).
30Wachs, New Perpetuities Legislation, VI OHIo ST. BAR Assoc. SBRV. LETrE 4 (1967).
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is now possible to "wait and see" if more children actually are born. Under the re-
vised rule, the class in Dollar Savings was complete at Mrs. Parson's death and the
lives of her children could be used as the lives in being.3' The delay that may re-
sult in part from waiting to determine such actualities is ameliorated by the cy pres
provision because it is probable that, if necessary, the gift can be reformed to meet
the standards of the rule.32
"Wait and see" statutes, such as Ohio's, which do not suggest a means of deter-
mining the measuring lives to be used, have been criticized.3 3 If the chosen mea-
suring life or lives are longer than the life or lives permissible for demonstration
purposes under the traditional rule,34 the perpetuities period will be lengthened.
When no rules are given to govern the selection, it becomfies crucial that the court
make a reasonable determination after viewing the situation in retrospect.3 Some
statutes have suggested a causal relationship defined in terms of lives which "play
a part in the ultimate disposition of the property."3 6 Examples given of such lives
include the preceding life tenant, the takers of the interest, a person designated as a
measuring life in the instrument, or some other person whose actions or death can
expressly or by implication cause the interest to vest or fail.3 7 A causal relationship
test was applied in the principal case because the court used the lives of the takers
of the interest as the lives in being.3 9
The Dollar Savings court first applied "wait and see" and only then turned to
cy pres or reformation. This seems consistent with the amendment's justification-
to carry out the intention of the grantor, unless he in fact violates the rule.3 9 The
reformation which may be required in Dollar Savings seems rather minor: the sav-
ings clause of the daughter's 1967 trust indenture which reads "twenty-one years
after the last to die of the daughter and all her issue" may be revised so that issue
is limited to the daughter's own children.40 This would exclude the grandchil-
dren for perpetuities purposes. Thus, reformation is only to occur when it becomes
certain that under the terms of the instrument vesting will occur beyond the period
of the rule. It seems to approximate most closely the intention of the creator of
the interest.4 ' No group is eliminated; only the measuring lives in the savings
clause have been changed.
Dollar Savings has answered most of the questions raised by commentators fol-
lowing the revision of the Ohio perpetuities statute. The court rejected the asser-
tions that the statute, as applied, had a retroactive effect and that the last sentence
of paragraph D was intended to effect a change in the substantive law. The court's
choice in selecting the measuring lives for perpetuities purposes shows that a causal
31 - Ohio Misc. at -, 285 N.E.2d at 778.
32 84 HARv. L. REv. 738, 745 (1971) points out that even in applying the orthodox rule,
courts frequently delay a decision on the validity of a remainder interest until the expiration of
preceding estates. With a cy pres provision, the courts may reform violations which ultimately
appear.
33 Id. at 744.
34 Perpetuities Reform, supra note 2, at 4.
35 Statutory Reform, supra note 15, at 302.
386 J. DUKEMINIER, JR., PERPETUITTS LAW IN ACTION 81 (1962).
37 Id.
38- Ohio Misc. at - , 285 N.E.2d at 778.
39 Perpetuities Reform, supra note 2, at 4.
40 - Ohio Misc. at-- , 285 N.E.2d at 779.
41 See, e.g., Lynn, A Practical Guide to The Rule Against Perpetuities, 1964 DuKE L.J. 207,
222 (1964); Statutory Reform, supra note 15, at 297.
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relationship test was applied. Finally, the "wait and see" amendment was applied
before the cy pres provision was considered. The resolution of these issues by theDollar Savings court should be used as a guide by other Ohio courts confronted with
perpetuities problems.
Elsie Hall
Bruce L. Downey
SECURITIES REGULATION-THE CONCEPT OF ACCESS IN THE PRIVATE OF-
FERING-SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972) and Pro-
posed Rule 146.
In SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co.,' the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
detailed access requirements needed to qualify for an exemption under § 4(2) of
the Securities Act of 19332 when a private placement is attempted 3 The case is
important because it implicitly recognizes distinct groups of offerees eligible for the
exemption, and because it can be used as a guide to interpret the term "access" as
used in § (e) of Proposed Rule 146, of the Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC), which deals with access to information in a private offering.4
Continental Tobacco involved two unregistered offerings made at two different
periods and under two different managements. In 1967, the SEC obtained a prelim-
inary injunction against Continental for publicly offering unregistered securities.
Subsequent to that order, the company was discharged in bankruptcy and came un-
der the control of Contoba Management Corporation. Between the spring of 1969
and the fall of 1970, Contoba sought to refinance Continental, and an offering and
attempted sale of 200,000 shares of common stock was undertaken. The offerees
were a diverse group and included "dentists, physicians, housewives, and business
men, who had no relationship with Continental other than that of shareholder." 5
The SEC challenged these activities and sought to have the 1967 injunction made
permanent. The district court heard the case and granted Continental an exemp-
42 Statutory Reform, supra note 15, at 299, notes that in order to save the gift to a class, a
remote member may be excluded by reformation. 84 HARv. L. REV. 738, 743 (1971) points
out that cy pres interjects uncertainty because there are several ways to reform an invalid will or
trust instrument. In most cases the courts use traditional trust techniques to ascertain the testa-
tor's intent and then select the method of reform to carry out that intent.
1463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
2 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2) (1970). This section appeared as § 4 (1) of the 1933 Act, but was re-
numbered 4(2) by the Securities Acts Amendments of 1946, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 12, 78 Star.565, 580, amending 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1958). The law now reads as follows: The Provisions
of section 77e [barring unregistered securities from interstate commerce and the mails] shall not
apply to... (2) transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.
a In addition to the access requirement, the existence of the exemption also depends upon
whether the purchaser's intent is to take for resale. The purchaser' of a privately placed security
must intend to hold it for investment rather than for resale. If he takes from the issuer for further
sale, he becomes a statutory "underwriter" within the definition of § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11)(1970), in which case the offering becomes public. The purchaser's intent is a question of fact,SEC Securities Act Release No. 4248 5 4 (1960) and his own statement is evidence on that in-
tent. Therefore, prudent issuers request investment letters from the buyer. These letters should
state negatively the language of § 2(11). 1 Loss, SEcuRTIs REGULATION 665 (2d ed. 1961).Such letters were employed in Continental Tobacco, and the investment intent of the buyers
was not a significant problem.
4 Proposed Rule 146,37 Fed. Reg. 26137,26140-41 (1972).
5 463 F.2d at 158.
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tion for the 1969-1970 activities. 6 That court felt the offerees involved were fully
aware of the risks of their investment and did not need the protections afforded by
a registration statement. Crucial to this determination was the fact that a brochure
provided by the company contained the same kind of information required in a
registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933.7 However, the court of
appeals did not feel this disclosure was sufficient. It reversed and held that "Con-
tinental failed to sustain its burden of affirmatively proving that all of the offerees
of Continental enjoyed a relationship with Continental making registration unneces-
sary." 8
Despite the fact that the private offering is one of the most significant classifica-
tions exempted from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act, the scope of the
exemption is not defined in the legislation.9 However, a judicial gloss has been
placed on the statute by SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.1o In that case the Supreme Court
denied a claimed private offering exemption for Ralston Purina's unregistered of-
ferings of stock to "key" employees." The Ralston Purina Court noted that "[t]he
natural way to interpret the private offering exemption is in light of the statutory
purpose."' 1 However, in giving content to that purpose, the Court went no further
6 326 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
7 One of the investors testified that the brochure which he received provided him access
to information concerning the terms of the offering (total number of shares being of-
fered, the offering price, and the part value per share) ; the speculative factors of his in-
vestment; the history of the defendant corporation, including its prior bankruptcy; the
nature of the defendant corporation's business, including the product to be produced
and the plan for its distribution; the authorized and outstanding debt and capital stock
of the defendant, together with the options outstanding to purchase common stock; the
intended use of proceeds from the sale of common stock; the management of the de-
fendant corporation with their background; a complete discription of the capital stock
of the defendant corporation, including dividend and voting rights of both defendant's
common and preferred stock and the redemption, conversion and preference rights
of the defendant's preferred stock; litigation to which the defendant was a party, in-
cluding this injunction proceeding and the entry of the temporary injunction; an
unaudited financial statement, including a balance sheet and an income and disburse-
ment or "ope'ating" statement.
Id. at 590.
8463 F.2d at 161.
9 The legislative history is of little help except insofar as it sets a general tone for the exemp-
tion. The House committee referred to this exemption as permitting "an issuer to make a spe-
cific or an isolated sale of its securities to a particular person" and to exemptions generally as
intended for transactions "where there is no practical need for [the bill's] application or where
the public benefits are too remote." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 7, 15-16 (1933).
For discussions of the exemption, see generally, 1 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 653-96; S. GoLDBERG,
PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND RESTRICTED SECURITIES (1971); Israels, Some Commercial Over-
tones of Private Placement, 45 VA. L. REv. 851 (1959); Meer, The Private Offering Exemption
Under the Federal Securities Act--A Study in Administrative and Judicial Contraction, 20 Sw.
L.J. 503 (1966); Patton, The Private Offering: A Simplified Analysis of the Initial Placement,
27 Bus. LAW. 1089 (1972); Sargent, Private Offering Exemption, 21 Bus. LAW. 118 (1965).
10 346 U.S. 119 (1953). See the following case notes for initial reactions to Ralston: 4
CATH. U.L. REV. 70 (1954); 52 MICH. L. REV. 298 (1953); 48 Nw. U.L. REV. 771 (1954); 21
U. CH. L. REV. 113 (1953); 3 UTAH L. REV. 519 (1953).
11 Ralston Purina's management did not define "key" employee by position on the organiza-
tion chart, but rather it spoke in terms of promotion potential, influence within the peef group,
and sympathy to management. 346 U.S. 119, 121-22 (1952).
12 Id. at 124-25.
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than the cryptic phrase "those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves,"' 18
and the equally mystifying concept of "access."' 14
Recent cases and SEC releases have attempted to hammer out the contours of
the exemption. 15 The "fend for themselves" language has spawned the argument
that if the offeree is a sophisticated investor, the requirements of the Act have been
satisfied. 16 A variation of this argument is particularly persuasive when applied to
the institutional investor which will have the necessary expertise and bargaining
power to ensure that the issuer will divulge all the information required for an in-
telligent investment decision. The approach is useful because it pragmatically at-
tempts to give content to "fend for themselves" and says the language ought not be
limited to the inside executive group mentioned in Ralston Purina. Value Line
Fund, Inc. v. Marcus'7 is an excellent example of the application of this rationale.
Value Line Fund was a large mutual fund which suffered sharp losses and sought
rescission of a purchase of unregistered stock. The Fund argued that it did not
have sufficient access to the issuer's records to make an informed investment deci-
sion. The court, however, rebuffed this plea holding that "the offerees possessed
enough sophistication to demand, and enough leverage at the bargaining table to
receive"' 8 the information it needed. The Fund's failure to make adequate investi-
gation was distinguished from not having access to adequate information. How-
ever, while Value Line tackles the problem of sophistication, it does not deal with
the problems of unsophisticated investors and the notion of access for that group.
Another interpretation of Ralston Purina has been the adoption of a conjunc-
tive test requiring both sophistication and access. While some kind of conjunc-
tive test is essential to ensure that offerees can "fend for themselves," the Tenth
Circuit in Lively v. Hirschfeld'9 articulated an overly restrictive version of this ap-
proach which denies the exemption unless the offeree has both exceptional business
experience and a position with the issuer which provides regular access to its busi-
13l. at 125-26.
14 The court stated that an offering to some employees, "e.g., one made to executive personnel
who because of their position have access to the same kind of information that the Act would
make available in the form of a registration statement" may not constitute a public offering. Id.15 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 1 CCH FED. SEC L. REP.
5 2770, for a discussion of the factors considered by the SEC in detefrmining whether an offer
meets the requirements for the exemption. See also Proposed Rule 146, 37 Fed. Reg. 26137(1972) for the current view as to what the contours of the exemption should be. For a compre-
hensive discussion of the facts and holdings in five other leading post-Ralston Purina cases, see
Shimer v. Webster, 225 A.2d 880, 882-85 (D.C. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
16 See Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Colo. 1965) (dicta) (emphasis sup-
plied): "[T]he seller must show that all offerees are given the information which a registration
statement would make available or that they did not need this protection." However, this "dis-junctive" view -of Ralston Purina's requirements does not seem to have been followed, and a
majority of the decisions discussing the point require both access and sophistication. The prob-
lem should be framed in terms of what is meant by access for a particular class of offerees. See,
e.g., Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971); Lively
v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Custer Channel Wing Co'p.,
376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.),,cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Supp.
1221 (D. Conn. 1969). See also, 1 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 664: "[The critical factor is not so
much the sophistication of the offerees as their possession of (or at least access to) information re-
garding the issuer .... "
17 Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 591,523 at 94,970 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Fuller v. Dilbert, 244 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd sub nom., Righter v. Dilbert, 358 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1966).
18 [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,523 at 94,970.
19 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
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ness records. Applied literally, the Lively standard has the effect of denying the
exemption to all except Ralston Purina's inside executive group. The problem
with Lively is not that it requires both access and sophistication, but that it is too
inflexible and too narrowly constricts the availability of the exemption. However, if
its tourniquet is loosened and its requirements modified, the case can be useful when
applied to the problem of access for the unsophisticated investor.
Access has generally been dealt with as a function of the relationship between
the parties, and the result has turned on whether the evidence indicated that the of-
feree had A reasonable opportunity to discover sufficient information about the is-
suer to permit an intelligent investment decision.20 Lively addresses itself directly
to the degree of access required by the unsophisticated investor and indicates spe-
cifically what it means by access. The issuer ought to be required to prove that all
offerees lacked a need for the protection of the Securities Act. However, a court
need not impose a requirement of regular access to company records through a posi-
tion with the issuer to accomplish this end. The goal could be effectively served
without unduly restricting the availability of the exemption by requiring issuers
wishing to make private placements to unsophisticated offerees to prepare and sub-
mit to all offerees the kind of information which would have been made available
in a registration statement.
A partial modification of the Lively rationale along the lines suggested above
was undertaken in Continental Tobacco. While not speaking explicitly in terms
of sophistication, the court implicitly adopts a highly pragmatic approach to the ex-
emption and would allow private placement if the offeree has or is given the abil-
ity to extract the necessary information from the issuer. The court indicated that
"if the offering is being made to a diverse and unrelated group, i.e. lawyers, grocers,
plumbers, etc., then the offering would have the appearance of being a public of-
fering." 21  The use of the word "appearance" in this sentence is important. It
creates a presumption that such an offering would be public, but it does not pre-
dude entirely the availability of an exemption. Through this language, Continental
Tobacco recognizes the existence of an exemption for the unsophisticated investor
and clearly treats the group before it as unsophisticated.;
Continental attempted to lay a comprehensive foundation for an exemption.
23
20 Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116, 119 (10th Cir. 1963) contains a detailed discussion of the
factors tending to show a close relationship and, therefore, access to needed information. Con-
tinental Tobacco gives three factors which will suffice when dealing with an unsophisticated
investor. 463 F.2d at 160.
21463 F.2d at 159 (emphasis supplied). The court was quoting Hill York Corp. v. Amer-
ican Int'l Franchises, 448 F.2d 680, 688 (5th Cir. 1971).
22 The concept of sophistication cannot be measured by concrete standards. The extremes
are easy to categorize. The bake shop foieeman and the clerical assistant in Ralston Purina
would probably admit to classification as unsophisticated. The mutual fund in Value Line em-
ploys investment analysts who will garner all relevant information before approving the invest-
ment and is easily classified as sophisticated. However, the intermediate case is more difficult.
The focus ought to be on whether the investor is financially sophisticated, not just whether he is,
in general, well educated. Relevant factors include the offeree's education, prior investment ex-
perience, and reliance on independent investment advice. These factors should be considered
in relation to the offeree's experience in financial matters. The inquiry is highly subjective,
and it would seem prudent to resolve doubts in favor of "unsophistication."
23 Continental's management prepared a detailed brochure on its prospects and operations.
See supra note 7. All materials in this brochure, including unaudited financial statements, were
updated as the company's circumstances changed during the period of the offer. The corpora-
tion also utilized a standard subscription agreement and investment letter, and contemplated
that the investment lettee would be executed by all investors. Indeed, the fact that "almost
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However, the court of appeals found that "mere disclosure" to "almost all" investors
was inadequate to establish the exemption.2 4 Even though Continental Tobacco
recognizes that an exemption may exist for the unsophisticated investor, the opin-
ion severely restricts the opportunity to avoid registration when dealing with this
class of offerees. The court did, however, detail three requisites25 that would pre-
sumedly rebut the presumption of a public offer raised by the presence of the un-
sophisticated offeree when all three are met.
First, the issuer must affirmatively prove that all offerees received the kind of in-
formation contained in a registration statement. In setting forth this requirement
the court made reference only to "written and oral information concerning Conti-
nental." 26  Howeyer, while that phrase is open to more than one interpretation, the
tenor of the court's opinion suggests that a stringent reading of the language isjustified. In the opinion, the court noted that the financial statements contained in
the materials given to the offerees were uncertified. In view of the heavy reliance on
Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, Inc.2 7 and the emphasis
there on the need for accurate data, the fact that the court even mentioned that the
financials were uncertified becomes highly significant. In fact, the overall effect of
this criterion may well be to require that the issuer make available some kind of
"offering circular" containing the kinds of information found in the brochure pro-
vided by Continental-plus certified financials. This requirement of detailed writ-
ten documentation for the offeree is justified. If only oral information or incom-
plete (or inaccurate) written information is required, an offeree will have a much
more difficult task in proving a misrepresentation than he would if this "offering
circular" requirement were to be imposed. In addition, such a requirement would
give the issuer a more reliable guide as to how much disclosure he must make to
qualify for the exemption. In any event, the court's point is clear: to avoid regis-
tration when dealing with the unsophisticated investor, disclosure must be accurate
and extensive.
Second, the issuer must show that all offerees had access to any additional infor-
mation which they might have required or requested. This requires that there be
an actual opportunity offered to inspect records and to verify statements made to of-
fexrees as inducements for the purchases.28
Third, the issuer must prove that all offerees had personal contacts with the'
officers of the corporation. Even assuming that the issuer is willing to open its files
to these offerees, this last requirement provides a major stumbling block to the avail-
ability of the exemption. In Continental Tobacco, the court found it crucial that
all" of the investors did execute the agreement impressed the district court. 326 F. Supp. 588,
589 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
24 463 F.2d 137, 160 (5th Cir. 1972).
25 The exact language used by the court was as follows:
Continental did not affirmatively prove that all offerees of its securities had received both
written and oral information concerning Continental, that all offerees of its securities
had access to any additional information which they might have required or requested,
and that all offerees of its securities had personal contacts with the officers of Continen-
tal.
2 6 Id.
27 448 F.2d 680, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1971).
28 463 F.2d at 158. This seems to incorporate much of the suggestion in I L. LOSS, supra
note 3, at 664-65:
[$]ome lawyers who handle "private placements" advise that each buyer receive a set
of certified financial statements comparable to those called for in a statutory prospectus
and be given an opportunity to examine the research memorandum prepared by the
investment banker who arranged the placement.
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two of the offerees, never had occasion, prior to their purchases, to meet with officers
of Continental.29 Furthermore, a single meeting with corporate officials would not
satisfy the requirement. The court used the phrase "personal contact," which im-
plies more than the formality of a meeting and suggests an on-going or long-
standing relationship. The precise nature of the relationship will vary with the sit-
uation, and it must be such that it creates "special advantages" in the purchaser
which make him substantially different from members of the general investment
public.8 0 However, it should be noted that the court spoke only of personal con-
tact, not of pre-existing personal contact with corporation officials. Indeed, the
relationship suggested by this language may often have its genesis in the attempt
by the issuer to comply with the access requirements outlined by the court. This
third criterion should not be read to require that the relationship between the is-
suer and the offeree antedate the issuer's efforts to make the placement. The
"personal contact" requirement should not be interpreted to preclude the use of an
investment representative. Such an exception would vicariously increase the level
of sophistication of the offeree. The court's expressed disapproval of the promo-
tional tactics used by Continental in attempting to find purchasers for its securities
indicates that this criterion probably contemplates a situation similar to the "negoti-
ated transaction" (as that term is used in Proposed Rule 146) and can be read to
include a ban on the kinds of promotional activities used by Continental.31
If confined to the unsophisticated investor class, the stringency of the Continental
Tobacco requirements is justified. Because of the low level of financial sophistica-
tion and the often-speculative nature of the venture at hand, private placements
create an extremely high potential for abuse. Therefore, such offerings deserve the
close scrutiny dictated by the decision in the principal case. However, at this point
a limitation on the scope of Continental Tobacco should be recognized. While the
opinion does set out specific and useful criteria for the private placement to the
unsophisticated investor, those criteria are not designed to deal with the kinds of
access which may be required for the sophisticated investor. Therefore, the case
should not be read as an attempt by the court to define specific criteria for an exemp-
tion for the sophisticated as well as unsophisticated investor. That question was
not before the court, and the opinion does not address itself to the special prob-
lems inherent in that kind of placement. An expansive reading of Continental
Tobacco is not justified by the context in which the case arose or by the language
used by the court. Such a reading would result in an unnecessary restriction on
the private placement exemption. 2 Applied beyond its scope, the holding could
preclude a private placement to the institutional investor. Such a result would be
contrary to the Ralston Purina construction of § 4(2), which emphasized the need
for the protections afforded by registration. As forcefully pointed out in Value
Line, institutional investors should be considered to occupy a special position in re-
gard to the private offering situation because they have the financial expertise and the
29 463 F.2d at 158.
80 Id. at 159.
81 See Proposed Rule 146(a)(3), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137 (1972). The ban on promotional activ-
ides would parallel § (c)(2)(i)-(iv) of the same rule. Id. at 26140.
32 In addition to making venture capital financing harder to find, an extremely restrictive
reading of § 4 (2) could have other ramifications of concern to securities lawyers. A tightening
of the exemption may encourage litigation by investors who have become disenchanted with oper-
ating results, and the issuer will more frequently be liable to a § 12(1) rescission or damage suit
brought by purchasers. The issuer's attorney could also be liable if his conduct in relation to
the offering amounted to a solicitation. See Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1052-53(2d Cir. 1969); Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 266 (D. C01o. 1965).
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bargaining power to extract the needed information from the issuer. Indeed, recent
public statements by members of the SEC indicate that this view is shared by the
Commission. 3
Reading Continental Tobacco in the manner suggested above allows private place-
ment to the inside executive group, the institutional investor, and, assuming the
three requisites are met, the unsophisticated group. However, the status of the
sophisticated investor who is not an institutional investor and not a member of an
inside group requires a more detailed analysis. In its general discussion of the class
to which an unregistered offering can be made, Continental Tobacco relied heavily
on Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, Inc.3 4 which had con-
cluded that the exemption was available if the placement was made to a "class of
persons having such a privileged relationship with the issuer that their present
knowledge and facilities for acquiring information about the issuer would make
registration unnecessary for their protection." 35  Although the exemption was de-
nied in Hill York, the opinion does not preclude an exclusion for a sophisticated
investor group. However, if the issuer cannot show that all the offerees involved
have the required level of sophistication and knowledge regarding the issuer, the
criteria in Continental Tobacco would need to be applied even if "almost all" of the
group did qualify. In Hill York the offering was limited to sophisticated business-
men and attorneys who planned to do business with the issuer. The court focused
on the lack of actual possession or access to the information provided in a registra-
tion statement. It reasoned that without this information, the level of sophistica-
tion was irrelevant because the offerees "could not bring their sophisticated knowl-
edge of business affairs to bear in deciding whether or not to invest."3  This is
clearly a rejection by the Fifth Circuit of the argument that sophistication without
some kind of access can form the basis for an exemption. However, it does not
follow from this conclusion that the three requisites detailed in Continental Tobacco
must be applied to this class in every instance. The focus of the decision on the
inability of the offerees to use their sophistication indicates that the major emphasis
should be on the ability of the offeree to extract information from the issuer.8 7
Such an approach is consistent with the Value Line rationale, which grants the is-
suer the exemption because the institutional investor has access to information due
to its considerable bargaining power.
33 SEC Chairman Casey suggested in a recent speech that he preferred institutional inves-
tors in private offerings. BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 140 at A-1 (Feb. 23, 1972). In a subse-
quent speech, Commissioner Owens stated that he would not support a reading of Ralston Purina
which excluded the institutional investor. He also indicated that he did not believe that the
position adopted by the Commission in Continental Tobacco was intended as a narrowing of
the exemption which would make it difficult or impossible for an institutional investor to qual-
ify. Id. No. 152 at G-2 (May 17, 1972).
34 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
35 Id. at 688 n.6.
36Id. at 690.
37 This position by Continental Tobacco borders on, but does not quite adopt, the position
-articulated by the Commission in its brief, which called for a "tantamount-to-an-insider" test:
Before the statutory protections may be safely eliminated in any case, the issuer
must affirmatively demonstrate by "explicit, exact" evidence that each person to whom
unregistered securities were offered was able to "fend" for himself-in other words,
that each offeree had a relationship to the company tantamount to that of an "insider"
in terms of his ability to know, to understand and to verify for himself all of the rele-
vant facts about the company and its securities.
Brief for Appellant at 28, SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972)
(footnotes omitted). The modification introduced by giving the offeree the information when
he does not have the ability to extract it himself is important.
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The offeree's bargaining power with the issuer will be a function of the size of
his potential capital contribution to the venture3 8 In most cases, the noninstitu-
tional investor's capital contribution is less than that of the institutional investor;
therefore, his relative bargaining power will also be less. To the extent this is true,
the noninstitutional offeree will not always have the same power as the institutional
investor to extract information from the issuer. However, Hill York and-,Contin-
ental Tobacco suggest that the exemption should be available even to the noninsti-
tutional investor without compliance with the three requisites in Continental
Tobacco if the offerees are a dose-knit group of friends and acquaintances with
an on-going relationship with the issuer of the kind that afforded the private of-
fering exemption in Woodward v. Wright.3 9  In Woodward, the court was con-
cerned with an action to rescind a contract for the sale of an undivided interest
in oil and gas rights and to recover the amount already paid on the contract.40
The statement offering to sell the interest was addressed to one person (Wood-
ward) and was signed by an agent of the sellers. The contract of sale which
the statement induced was between the owners of the oil and gas lease and Wood-
ward along with three other purchasers who were associated with him in the ven-
ture. The contract was entered into after face-to-face negotiation and on-the-ground
inspection of the facilities involved. "The whole transaction was a closely knit
arrangement among friends and acquaintances, and was conducted on a personal
basis . . . [and] . . . [alll of the purchasers apparently entered into the transaction
with sophisticated discernment." 41
Therefore if the facts indicate that the offeree has sufficient bargaining power
to extract the necessary information from the issuer or that a Woodward-type
situation exists, there is no need for the protections inherent in registration,
and the exemption should be available. However, if neither of these situations ex-
ist, then the exemption should be denied unless the issuer has complied with the
three requisites in Continental Tobacco. Such an approach is consonant with Ral-
ston Purinds concepts of "fend for themselves" and "access." It also allows pri-
vate placements with small groups of venture capitalists who are willing to invest
in highly speculative enterprises, and gives such businesses access to external financ-
ing without the rigors of registration.42
If it is recognized that the essential element in Continental Tobacco's handling
28 Proposed Rule 146(d) and (f) express the same idea. 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26140-41
(1972).
a9 266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959). See also Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (W.D.
Penn. 1951). The Hill York opinion refers to both cases. 448 F.2d 680, 690 n.10 (5th Cir.
1971).
40 The court found the transaction involved to be a sale of securities:
[A) fractional undivided interest in oil and gas becomes a "security" when it is created
out of the ownership of an interest in oil and gas or other mineral rights for the pur-
pose of sale or offering for sale. Correlatively, the sale or offering for sale of an oil
and gas lease, or an undivided interest therein, may be the sale of an "investment
contract," hence a security, when the transaction carries with it something more than
the assignment of a "naked lease-hold right," as where the purchasers look entirely
to the efforts of other persons to make their investment a profitable venture.
Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 112 (10th Cir. 1959).
41Id. at 115.
42 Registration can be unduly costly, time-consuming, and inflexible, and may interfere with
the issuer's desire to keep information and plans confidential from all those who are not selected
as offerees. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 691-96. See also, PRACTIcING LAW INslTIuTE,
How TO Do A PaRvATE OFFERING-USING VENTURE CAPITAL, Course Handbook Series No.
53 (1970).
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of the exemption is the offeree's ability to extract information from the issuer, then
it becomes clear that the detailing of highly structured standards for giving the un-
sophisticated group the information is merely an application of this "extraction"
principle to the particular class of offerees before the court. The goal is to give
the offeree the ability to extract from the issuer the information needed for an in-
telligent investment decision, and the underlying philosophy is one of pragmatism.
The approach allows standards of access to be dictated by the needs of the offeree
and by his ability to get information from the issuer. Such an approach is suffi-
ciently flexible to accommodate differences between classes of investors, while al-
lowing the exemption only where the protections of the Act are not needed.
Therefore, if kept within its proper limits and read in conjunction with Hill York,
the decision can be used to delineate the access requirements for the private offering
exemption.
This is particularly important at this date in view of the fact that the SEC has
only recently promulgated Proposed Rule 146 dealing with issuer transactions not
involving a public offering.43  The Proposed Rule and the accompanying release
outline criteria for an automatic exemption under § 4(2). It should be noted that
the release states that the criteria are not exclusive and that "a claim for exemption
could be established without complying with all the provisions of the rule" if the
issuer can satisfy the requirements in relevant judicial and administrative interpre-
tations of § 4(2) in effect at the time of the transaction.44 To be exempted un-
der this Rule, the securities must be offered and sold in a negotiated transaction.
The Rule defines a negotiated transaction as one in which "the terms and arrange-
ments relating to any sale of securities are arrived at through direct communication
between the issuer or any person acting on its behalf and the purchaser or his in-
vestment representative.'' 4 5 The Rule further states that any seminar or promo-
tional meeting or certain written communications made otherwise than in connec-
tion with a negotiated transaction will constitute general advertising and preclude
a private offering.46 As indicated above, these requirements would clearly prohibit
an automatic exemption for the activities used by Contoba Management in Con-
tinental Tobacco.
However, the Rule is distressingly ambiguous as to the scope and content of §
(e), which is entitled "Access to Information." 47  This section is written in the
disjunctive and speaks of having "the same kind of information that the Act would
make available in the form of a registration statement" or "access to such informa-
tion." However, neither the Rule nor the release even attempts to define these
concepts. Therefore, it is unclear which offerees have the requisite access, and as
a result, issuers cannot tell when the requirement to provide information to the
offerees becomes operative. Furthermore, the point at which the potential investor
43 Proposed Rule 146,37 Fed. Reg. 26137 (1972).
44 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5336 (Nov. 28, 1972). 37 Fed. Reg. 26137 (1972).
45 Proposed Rule 14 6 (a)(3), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137 (1972).
46 Proposed Rule 146(c) (2) (i)-(iv), Id. at 26140.
47 Section (e) feads:
(e) Access to Information. Each offeree or his investment representative shall, during
the course of the negotiated transaction:
(1) have the same kind of information that the Act would make available in the
form of a registration statement, to the extent such information is available, or have
access to such information; and
(2) have access to any additional information necessary to verify the accuracy of such
information.
Id. at 26140-41.
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will have the requisite ihformation is obfuscated by the addition of the phrase "to
the extent such information is available." 48  In short, this section is of no help in
trying to establish objective criteria for access. Therefore, it is suggested that the
essential pragmatism inherent in Continental Tobacco is an excellent vehicle for de-
ciphering the vagaries which exist due to the terminology used by § (e). If Con-
tinental Tobacco is followed, the kinds of access required become a function of the
class to which the particular offerees belong, and the issuer's duties vis-1-vis each
class vary with the offeree's ability to extract information from the issuer. With
an inside executive group, the company's duty of providing access is satisfied be-
cause the members of this class, due to their positions with the issuer, have the kind
of information which would be made available through a registration statement. If
the issuer is dealing with an institutional investor, the duty to provide information
and access to records is minimal because such an offeree has sufficient bargaining
power to get as much information as the SEC elicits through registration.
49 With
such offerees, the issuer's duty should not entail detailed preparation of documents
and the complete access required in Continental Tobacco. However, when a diverse
and unsophisticated group is involved, the three criteria detailed by Continental
Tobacco would become operative to determine the issuer's duty to provide access
and the availability of the exemption. When dealing with the kind of group in-
volved in Hill York, the availability of the exemption should turn on two factual
inquiries. First, do all the offerees have the bargaining power to extract the neces-
sary information from the issuer? Second, if not, is there a Woodward-type situa-
tion in which a dose-knit group provides the needed access? If both questions
are answered in the negative, then the issuer must comply with the requirements
of Continental Tobacco or the exemption should be denied. Whatever the ulti-
mate content of the rule adopted by the SEC, the decision in Continental Tobacco
can be used to provide a valuable and flexible analytical tool for determining the ac-
cess requirements of the private offering exemption. However, if Continental To-
bacco is used, it is imperative that the limitations of the decision be recognized
so that its specific requirements are not inflexibly applied outside the proper factual
context.5o
48 Id.
49 1 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 663 says: In the case of offerings to institutional investors...
the larger insurance companies are not only "able to fend for themselves" [but) [s]ometimes
they seem to elicit even more information than the SEC does. See also S. GOLDBERG, supra note
9, at § 4.2(c) and the authorities collected therein at note 85.
50 The Court in Ralston Purina indicated that any arbitrary numerical limitation on the avail-
ability of the exemption was not in keeping with the statutory purpose: "[Tlhere is no warrant
for superimposing a quantity limit on private offerings as a matter of statutory interpretation."
346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). However, the Court also indicated that "nothing prevents the com-
mission, in enforcing the statute, from using some kind of numerical test in deciding when to
investigate particular exemption claims." Id. The use of a numerical rule of thumb has appeal,
however, in attempting to find objective standards for the private offering exemption. Proposed
Rule 146(f) limits the exemption to purchases by not more than 35 persons in any consecutive
12-month period. However, the Rule then provides an exemption from this fequirement for
purchasers buying more than $250,000 worth of securities for cash. 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26141
(1972). This "quantity limitation" in § (f) might raise the question of whether the rule is in-
consistent with Ralston Purina and, if so, whether that opinion represents a limitation on the
permissible rule-making authority of the SEC in this area. However, the requirements of the
Rule need not and should not be read as inconsistent with the Court's opinion in Ralston Purina.
There the Court disapproved a "quantity limitation" in terms of offerees, not purchasers, and the
Proposed Rule leaves the number of offerees unlimited. Such a distinction is more than a mat-
ter of semantics, and it should be sufficient to make the limitations a permissible administrative
device. The proposed Federal Securities Code adopts a similar limitation for buyers of secu-
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In addition to filling a void in Proposed Rule 146, Continental Tobacco's ap-
proach to access for the unsophisticated offeree is also to be preferred to the ap-
proach adopted by the proposed Federal Securities Code.51 The Code's analogue to
the private placement is the "limited offering." 52  Under the Code, a "limited of-
fering" may be made to an unlimited number of institutional investors and to not
more than 35 other purchasers of securities.53 This makes it possible for an unlim-
ited number of institutional investors to combine with the limited number of non-
institutional investors to purchase securities in a particular offering. To the extent
the definition of the institutional investor keeps that class within its proper
bounds, 54 the Code's treatment of the institutional investor has great merit in view
of the demonstrated ability of these investors to "fend for themselves." However,
while the treatment of the institutional investor obviates the danger of extending
Continental Tobacco beyond its proper scope, the Code's handling of the noninsti-
tutional investor sacrifices too much in the form of investor protection and full
disclosure to the vagaries of the antifraud remedies. The Code's approach would
allow an issuer to contact an unlimited number of offerees and to form a group of
35 naive purchasers who would be willing to purchase securities when it would be
dear to a sophisticated investor that there is little or no chance that the transaction
will be profitable. Therefore, when dealing with the noninstitutional investor in
general and the unsophisticated investor in particular, Continental Tobacco's analysis
of the problem seems better suited to provide dear standards, adequate investor pro-
tection and reasonably limited interference with the operation of the private place-
ment as a device for raising needed capital.
James R. King*
rities. The Reporter's Comment justifies the approach by stating that the Tentative Draft "goes
over to the number of buyers, leaving the number of offerees unlimited, for two reasons: because
the breadth of the definition of 'offer' makes it difficult to count offerees, and because it is dif-
ficult to see how an offeree who does not buy is hurt." ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 227(b)(1)(A),
Comment (2)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972). The fationale would apply with equal force to
Proposed Rule 146.
51 ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).
52 1d. § 227(b).
531d. § 227(b)(1)(A).
54 The Code's definition of the institutional investor is as follows:
(a) a bank, insurance company, or registered investment company, or a parent of any
such person, except to the extent that the Commission provides otherwise by rule with
respect to any such class of persons on the basis of such factors as financial sophisti-
cation, net worth, and the amount of assets undee investment management, or (b) any
other person of a class that the Commission designates by rule on the basis of such
factors.
Id. § 242(a). The Reporter's Comment notes that the necessary flexibility in the definition
cannot be obtained entirely through the statute. It further states that the definition in § 242(a)
"is premised on the assumption that the Commission will make any ungrudging use of its rule-
making authority" to add or delete from the groups which comprise the institutional investor
category in the Code's definition. Id. § 242, Comment 2.
* Editorial Associate, Eugene H. Nemitz, Jr.
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CASE NOTES
that the "rather unguarded" language used in Linkletter is indicative of real reliance
on deterrence as the dominant rationale for the exclusionary rule.29
This brief review of the evolution of the exclusionary rule demonstrates that
in Calandra, the Sixth Circuit was confronted with a history of interpretation en-/
compassing diverse application and justification for the rule. It is important to
recognize that although in its recent decisions the Supreme Court has placed increas-
ing emphasis on the deterrent value of exclusion, the Court has also continued to be
concerned with the maintenance of the normative rationale.30 The Sixth Circuit's
decision to extend the availability of the rule to a grand jury witness who had been
granted transactional immunity must be considered in light of this development as
well as within the framework of the competing interests involved-the efficient op-
eration of the grand jury system and the right to privacy3l incorporated in the fourth
amendment. However, any effective balancing of these values must necessarily focus
on the exclusionary rule and its proper role in the protection of fourth amendment
rights. Moreover, an understanding of the development of the rule is required
when one recognizes that the exclusionary rule has recently been the target for
severe attack.32 The chief thrust of such attacks has been the assertion that exclu-
sion has failed to achieve its assumed purpose-the deterrence of unlawful police
conduct.
An evaluation of the actual deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule is beyond
the scope of this discussion; however, some of the available data tend to demonstrate
a limit to the effectiveness of exclusion as a deterrent to unlawful searches.33 The
extent of any such limit is unclear, though, since the evidence is contradictory.3 4
Equally important are the acknowledgement that there is currently no effective alterna-
tive to exclusion3 5 and the recognition that deterrence is not the only viable rationale
for the rule; as the cases above indicate, the Court displays significant concern with
"the imperative of judicial integrity."36 Moreover, one of the material advantages
of the exclusionary rule is that it provides, through the utilization of the frequently
recurring forum of the criminal trial, for the development of fourth amendment
doctrine. Without the exclusionary rule, litigation would be substantially reduced
and this development would be curtailed.37
It is within these limits of the exclusionary rule that the Calandra case must
be evaluated. When the exclusionary rule is envisioned as existing either to deter
29 Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. Cm. L. Rnv.
342, 353-54 (1967).
30 "Normative" is the label that has been applied to the justification for the exclusionary rule
which concerns the evil of government participation in illegal conduct. See Oaks, supra note 21,
at 668.
31 Use of the term "right to privacy" refers to the right to be free from unreasonable govern-
ment intrusion. The right to privacy emanates from the first and fifth amendments, as well as
the fourth amendment, and embodies the individual's right to personal security. See, e.g., Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 768-95 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).32 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 411-27 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971).
3 3 See, e.g., Oaks, supra note 21, at 720-36.
34 Id. at 683-87.
35 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
86 See discussion accompanying footnotes 14 to 29, supra.
3 7 See, e.g.., Comment, The Tort Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
63 J. CRIM. L C. & P.S. 256,257 (1972).
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CASE NOTES
ment is also used to violate fifth amendment rights-thus making status as a defen-
dant necessary in order to have standing for a suppression motion.45
The Calandra court did not explicitly acknowledge this possible reading of Al-
derman and, therefore, did not speak directly to the inconsistent conclusions inherent
in the government position. Judge Miller did, however, refer at length to In re Fried4 6
and Centracchio v. Garrity,47 both of which noted that pre-indictment motions to
suppress are cognizable. After recognizing that the pre-indictment motion to sup-
press is asserted as lying "in the inherent disciplinary power" of the court,48 the
Calandra court clarified the nature of the fourth amendment violation when Judge
Miller rejected the government contention that the grant of immunity to Calandra
should determine his standing:
The Government's position is a distortion of the nature of the rule an-
nounced in Weeks v. United States... giving effect to the prohibitions of
the Fourth Amendment. While evidence is excluded under the Fifth
Amendment to prevent the abridgment of one's rights in the criminal pro-
cess, the Fourth Amendment, in contrast, was not intended to protect the
rights of a defendant once involved in the process. Rule 41(e) and the
exclusionary rule generally are addressed . . . to the provision of redress
for the constitutional violations that have already occurred.49
Judge Miller emphasized the deterrent rationale for exclusion but also considered
suppression to be the vindication of rights already infringed. He finally argued
that the grand jury witness who is a "stranger" to criminal proceedings ought to
have enhanced standing to seek redress. Such a position is consistent with the pur-
pose underlying exclusion whether it be deterrence, judicial integrity, or both. More-
over, although vicarious assertion of fourth amendment violations is equally con-
sistent with these goals, 50 the standing of Calandra does not appear to have suffered
4 5 Alderman can thus be read as a compromising of the Court's reliance on the exclusionary
rule and as a retreat by the Court to the personal incuimination theory as the rationale for the
rule. For a discussion of the court's pre-Alderman rejection of personal incrimination as a
basis for exclusion, see Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure,
34 U. CHm. L. REV. 342, 347-49 (1967). For analysis of the inctimination theory post-Alder-
man, see 33 OHIO ST. LJ. 181, 197-205 (1972).
46 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947). The case concerned the possession of, among other things,
256 bales of crude rubber, believed to have been stolen from a foreign shipment. Defendant's
place of business was searched at the time of his arrest. The court recognized the validity of pre-
indictment suppression but found the searches in this case to have been lawful due to effective
consents by one of the defendants.
47 198 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1952). Centfacchio had voluntarily given the evidence in ques-
tion to agents of the Internal Revenue Service after a purported promise that he would not be
prosecuted. Again the court recognized the validity of the procedure urged by the parties but
found that there had been no fourth amendment violation.
48 465 F.2d at 1223. The court relied on Go-Baft Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
344, 355 (1931):
The United States attorney and the special agent in charge, as officers authorized to con-
duct such prosecution and having control and custody of the papers for that purpose,
are, in respect of the acts relating to such prosecution, alike subject to the proper exer-
tion of the disciplinary powers of the court. And on the facts here shown it is plain
that the district court had jurisdiction summarily to determine whether the evidence
should be suppressed and the papers returned to the petitioners.
One commentator has argued that reliance on the court's disciplinary powers requires a distinc-
tion between the witness' standing to assert his right not to testify and his standing to seek return
of his property. 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1193, 1203 (1971).
49 465 F.2d at 1223 (emphasis original).
50 See, e.g., Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. CHI.
L. REV. 342, 359-62 (1967); 24 STAN. L. REV. 947 (1972).
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jury process to override a witness' assertion of fourth amendment rights. The argu-
ment embodies the basic thrust of the government's second contention in the princi-
pal case-that a grant of the suppression motion will unduly burden and delay the
grand jury proceeding. To support this stand, the government relied, in part, on
Blair v. United States.56 In Blair the Supreme Court held that a grand jury wit-
ness had no standing to question congressional power to regulate primary elections
for the office of United States Senator. Neither the fifth nor the fourth amend-
ments were relied upon by the witnesses, who based their refusal to testify on an
attack upon the power and jurisdiction of the grand jury to investigate violation
of what the witnesses asserted was an unconstitutional statute. The Blair Court
stated that:
[Ilt is clearly recognized-that the giving of testimony and the attendance
upon court or grand jury in order to testify are public duties which every
person within the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform upon
being properly summoned .... The personal sacrifice involved is a part of
the necessary contribution of the individual to the welfare of the public. 57
Judge Miller conceded the abstract validity of these enunciations in Blair; he also ac-
knowledged an assertion by the Second Circuit that "a witness usually cannot impede
collection of evidence.., even though the issues he seeks to raise could later be liti-
gated ... by an indicted defendant."58 Nevertheless, Judge Miller correctly pointed
out that the holding in Blair was equivocal in that the Blair Court made dear that
the articulated policy was subject to exceptions and qualification-specifically the
fifth amendment, "confidential matters," and other "special reasons." 59 It is at least
arguable that "confidential matters" include the privacy and anonymity secured by
the fourth amendment. In addition, the Calandra court was cognizant that the Su-
preme Court has not, since Blair, had occasion to consider the specific question pre-
sented in the instant case.60
Judge Miller, after acknowledging the government's cited authority in support]
of the position that the investigative process of the grand jury should not be dis-/
turbed in order to vindicate the interests secured by the fourth amendment and th
exclusionary rule, attempted to distinguish all of the cases by pointing out that none,
of the decisions cited dealt with the general standirg of a "person aggrieved" to,
vindicate fourth amendment rights.61 With one exception Judge Miller's dismissal
of the contrary authority is justified. That-exception is Gelbard v. United States.62
In Gelbard the Supreme Court interpreted the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act to preclude contempt findings against grand jury witnesses who
56 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
57 Id. at 281.
58United States ex rel. Rosado v. Flood, 394 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1968).
59 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919).
60 In Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962), the Court had the opportunity to decide the
issue in a closely related context. Lanza was convicted for refusing to testify before a committee
of the New York Legislature after having been immunized from prosecution. His ground for
the refusal to testify was that the questions that were to be asked by the committee were based
upon unlawful electronic interception of his conversations. The Court, however, found that at
least two proffered questions were not so based and upheld the conviction upon an independent
state ground, thus never directly considering the constitutional claim.
61 The cases cited by the government were United States ex rel. Rosado v. Flood, 394 F.2d
139 (2d Cir. 1968); Carter v. United States, 417 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
935 (1970); Application of United States, 427 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1970); Gelbard v. United
States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
62 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
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had been granted immunity and who nevertheless refused to testify in response to
questions the witnesses believed to be based upon information obtained by illegal
wiretapping of their conversations. While Judge Miller's holding in Calandra
appears on its face to be consistent with Gelbard, there are indications that a major-
ity of the Supreme Court would disagree with the Sixth Circuit's resolution of the
Calandra case. The plurality in Gelbard left open the precise question presented
in Calandra.6 3 However, the four dissenters and Justice White, in concurrence, indi-
cated they would not be patient with what Justice White labeled as "protracted in-
terruption of grand jury proceedings":
I agree with the Court, however,'that at least where the United States
has intercepted communications without a warrant in circumstances where
court approval was required, it is appropriate in construing and applying
28 U.S.C. § 1826 not to require the grand jury witness to answer and
hence further the plain policy of the wiretap statute. This unquestion-
ably works a change in the law with respect to the rights of a grand jury
witness, but it is a change rooted in a complex statute....
Where the Government produces a court order for the interception,
however, and the witness nevertheless demands a full-blown suppression
hearing to determine the legality of the order, there may be room for strik-
ing a different accommodation between the due functioning of the grand
jury system and the federal wiretap statute. Suppression hearings in these
circumstances would result in protracted interruption of grand jury pro-
ceedings. At the same time, prosecutors and other officers who have been
granted and relied on a court order for the interception would be subject
to no liability under the statute, whether the order is valid or not; and,
in any event, the deterrent value of excluding the evidence will be mar-
ginal at best. It is well, therefore, that the Court has left this issue open
for consideration by the District Court on remand.6 4
Three days after Gelbard was decided, these same five Justices again indicated
their reluctance to create even constitutionally based privileges that allow a grand
jury witness to refuse to testify. In Branzburg v. Hayes65 the Court refused to
grant grand jury witnesses the right to refuse to reveal sources from which the wit-
nesses had derived news stories. The parties had urged that the first amendment
precluded the necessity of their divulging confidential sources and argued that forced
disclosure of the sources would unduly infringe upon their own and the public's
first amendment right to unfettered news reporting. In refusing to recognize such
a privilege, the Court stated:
Until now the only testimonial privilege for unofficial witnesses that is
rooted in the Federal Constitution is the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. We are asked to create another by inter-
preting the First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that
other citizens do not enjoy. This we decline to do. Fair and effective
law enforcement aimed at providing security for the person and property
of the individual is a fundamental function of government, and the grand
jury plays an important, constitutionally mandated role in this process. 66
The court stated that on the record presented to it, no basis existed to find the pub-
lic interest in law enforcement and efficient grand jury operation inadequate to
63 Id. at 61 n.22.
64 Id. at 70 (emphasis supplied).
65 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
66 Id. at 689-90.
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override "the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said
to result from insisting that reporters respond to the relevant questions .. in the
course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial. '6 7
Judge Miller confronted the positions articulated in Gelbard and Branzburg
without explicit reference to either case.68 Referring again to Blair, he fairly identi-
fied the interest to be balanced against the exclusion of evidence in the grand jury
-a grand jury free to determine the truth through unencumbered inquiry. The
grand jury is to be "a grand inquest . whose inquiries ...[are] ...not to be
limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the
investigation."69  After so characterizing the grand jury, Judge Miller nevertheless
proceeded to the conclusion that "it is not at all dear that the procedure approved
by [the district court] would unduly burden the functioning of the grand jury."7 0
Perhaps one reason why the Sixth Circuit did not concern itself in depth with the
Gelbard position or with its concommitant concern, delay, is the able discussion that
District Judge Battisti proffered in response to the government's original case.71
Judge Battisti characterized delay as avoidable delay and stated that "time properly
consumed in ...holding a hearing to examine whether one's constitutionally pro-
tected rights have been violated is not delay ...."72 Both the district court and the
Sixth Circuit concluded that a proper balancing of the interests involved compelled
the sustaining of Calandra's standing to assert his fourth amendment rights. Judge
Miller conceded that it is impossible to empirically verify the effectiveness of sup-
pression in discouraging unlawful invasion of privacy, but he also correctly con-
cluded that the deterrence mechanism operates to achieve positive effects only when
deterrence is accomplished by the removal of incentives.73 Judge Miller then took
cognizance of today's prevalent concern with law enforcement's campaign against
organized crime and the very real incentive which therefore exists to violate the
rights of the "small fry" in- order to reach "key figures."7 4 The court concluded:
The importance of suppression as a device is directly proportional to the
incentive that exists to violate the right. Where, as here, the incentive is
greatest, access to the motion to suppress attains maximum importance....
Absent the opportunity to raise the claim at this stage in the proceed-
ings, Calandra's opportunity for redress is severely limited and at the same
1071d. at 690-91.
6sThe reason that the Sixth Circuit did not directly acknowledge the impact of Geihard is
unclear since the government argued its relevance forcefully. See Supplemental Memorandum
for Appellant, United States v. Calandra, 465 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1972).
69 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
70 465 F.2d at 1225.
71 judge Battisti dealt at length with the dissenting opinion of Circuit Judge Gibbons in In
re Egan, 450 F.2d 199 (3rd Cir. 1971), aJ'd sub uom., Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41
(1972). Judge Battisti rejected the assertion that the public interest in efficient judidal adminis-
tration is paramount:
The judicial system is designed to protect the Bill of Rights, not to cast it aside in a
mad rush toward the goal of judicial efficiency. Any examination of a potential in-
fringement of those rights can, under no circumstances, be considered avoidable delay.
The reports cite numerous examples where courts have "delayed" the ultimate resolu-
tion of a case so that constitutional objections could be heard at a fair hearing and a
reliable determination could be reached.
In re Calandra, 332 F. Supp. 739, 741 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (citations omitted).
72 Id.
73 See Comment, Standing To Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. CHi. L.
REV. 342, 356-5 7 (1967) for elaboration on this point.
74 465 F.2d at 1226.
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time the very substantial incentive for law enforcement officials to com-
bine the illegal search with a grant of immunity at the grand jury stage is
unrestrained.75
The Sixth Circuit has reached a defensible balance76 of the competing interests
present in the Calandra case. The recent Supreme Court decision in United States
v. DionisioY7 however, may prove to be a further indication that the Court will
not accept the assertion of fourth amendment rights in the context of the grand
jury proceeding. In Dionisio the Court held that the grand jury could compel the
giving of voice exemplars by approximately 20 persons,78 including Dionisio, for
comparison with recorded conversations that had been received in evidence. In re-
sponding to Dionisio's contention that the procedure was a violation of his fourth
amendment rights, the Court stated that "a grand jury subpoena to testify is not
that kind of governmental intrusion on privacy against which the Fourth Amend-
ment affords protection once the Fifth Amendment is satisfied." 79
Dionisio is distinguishable from Calandra in that Dionisio contended that the
grand jury subpoena and his forced compliance were the governmental acts that
violated his rights; 80 Calandra sought suppression of evidence after the violation
751d. at 1226-27. At this point one may question why the Calandra court did not consider
the issue whether Calandra should have asserted his rights only by an action for damages as estab-
lished in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). In fact the government did not argue this point which may again have resulted from
the district court's able discussion:
In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that the mere suppression of evidence is not suf-
ficent. to correct the violation of one's privacy by agents performing a warrantless
search. It held that the Fourth Amendment also authorizes a suit for damages recovef-
able upon proof of injuries resulting from federal agents' violation of that Amend-
ment. If suppression alone is not sufficient then how could money alone be an adequate
remedy? Therefore, neither the motion to return nor a suit for damages can be held
to be an adequate protection of one's Fourth Amendment rights. It is just as inadequate
to be informed that one will not be prosecuted for governmental misconduct as it is
to say that years later the United States may monetarily reimburse one for its viola-
tions of his privacy. Money damages do not constitute complete restitution for the
infringement of constitutional rights.
In re Calandra, 332 F. Supp. 737, 741 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
A second question also arises at this juncture, whether Calandra, under current law, would be
able to assert his fourth amendment rights if called as a witness at trial rather than at a grand jury
proceeding. No court has, before Calandra, directly addressed the right of a witness to assert
his fourth amendment tights in any context. See Comment, Electronic Surveillance of the Grand
Jury Witness: Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations Intended to Produce Conviction of
Someone Other Than- the Victim, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 546, 567 (1972); Note, The Fourth
Amendment Right of Privacy: Mapping the Future, 53 VA. L. REv. 1314 (1967). Logically
there is no reason to limit the privilege extended to Calandra to the grand jury. Moreover, if the
rights protected by the Calandra result are to retain vitality, the privilege must be extended.
76 The Calandra court approaches the task of balancing from the traditional standpoint of
weighing the interests of society against unlawful search on the one hand and the interest in ef-
fective grand jury investigation on the other. It has been argued that the proper fulcrum, for
any judicial balancing in the fourth amendment context, should be the "reasonableness" of
particular searches and seizures. See 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 181, 201-05 (1972).
77 41 U.S.L.W. 4180 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1973).
78 Each witness was advised that he was a potential defendant in a criminal prosecution. All
were asked to examine a transcript of an intercepted conversation and to go to a nearby office of
the United States attorney to read the transcript into a recording device. The witnesses were ad-
vised that they would be allowed to have theif attorneys present when they read the transcripts.
Id.
79 Id. at 4183.
8 0 At the appellate level in Dionisio, 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cit. 1971), the court relied on Davis
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of his rights had occurred. The Dionisio holding, however, arguably undercuts atleast one justification for the result in Calandra. The granting of Calandra's mo-
tion to suppress was based almost exclusively upon the deterrence rationale for the
exclusionary rule. Such a basis is logically consistent with concepts of standing
and effective use of the exclusionary rule. However, as was noted at the outset,
the deterrent aspects of exclusion have been seriously questioned.8 1 Prior to the
Dionisio decision, the Calandra result could be justified by independent reliance
upon the argument that compelling testimony based upon illegal evidence is the
equivalent of compelling the witness to further the violation of his own rights.82
Such forced violation arguably involves the courts not in the sanctioning of un-
lawful conduct but in the perpetrating thereof, and such conduct should there-
fore be precluded. Although the concept of the grand jury is apparently in a tran-
sitional stage,S3 at least one of the functions of the grand jury has, historically, been
the protection of people from unwarranted "harassment and unfounded prosecu-
tion."8 4 It ought to follow that the grand jury should be precluded from compell-
ing a witness to further the violation of his own rights; however, the Dionisio hold-
ing is an indication that the court would be reluctant to accept this position.
Grounded upon existing conceptions of the fourth amendment's guarantee
against the invasion of privacy and the nature of the needs of an efficiently oper-
ating grand jury system, the Sixth Circuit has reached a defensible result in Calan-
dra. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court foreshadow the possibility that theSupreme Court will be reluctant to uphold the decision. Thege enunciations reaf-
firm the present Court's belief in an unencumbered grand jury and its disenchant-
ment with the exclusionary rule. It is suggested that a principled evaluation of
the long-standing content of the fourth amendment should demonstrate the over-
riding value in protecting the right of privacy at the cost of some burden on grandjury proceedings. Furthermore, a serious consideration of the exclusionary rule
should indicate its continuing viability. The rule has been criticized as ineffective,
v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). The Davis Court held that it was error to admit the peti-
tioner's fingerprints into evidence at his trial for rape because they had been obtained during apolice detention following a roundup of Davis and more than twenty other persons. The SeventhCir'cuit reasoned that "[tQhe dragnet effect here, 'here approximately 20 persons were sub-poenaed for purposes of identification, has the same invidious effect on fourth amendment rights
as the practice condemned in Davis." 442 F.2d at 281.
81 See discussion accompanying footnotes 33-37, supra.
82 This argument is based upon analogy to Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920). See, e.g., 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1193, 1204 (1971); 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 881,901 (1972). The argument takes on added dimension when the Supreme Court's decision inKastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), is considered. In this case the Court held agrant of "use" immunity sufficient to compel testimony from a witness who asser'ts fifth amend-
ment privileges. Transactional immunity was said to afford broader protection than the fifth
amendment privilege and therefore was not constitutionally required. Although in Calandrathe government did seek transactional immunity, Kastigar indicates that this would not havebeen necessary. If a witness who is granted only use immunity is compelled to testify with
regard to evidence illegally seized from him and if the government thereby subsequently dis-
covers sufficient independent evidence to prosecute the witness, it is at least arguable that the
compelled testimony has violated that witness' fifth amendment rights as well as his fourth
amendment rights.
83 See Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 HARV. L REV. 590, 596-97 (1961).
84 See United States v. Dionisio, 41 U.S.L.W. 4180, 4193 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). The placement of the grand jury guarantee in the Bill of Rights is indicative ofthe dominant character of the protective role. See also footnote 54, supra, which demonstratesdoubt about the assumption that testimony before a grand jury produces no harmful effects upon
the witness.
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and legislative alternatives have been suggested.85 However, this criticism ignores all
implications of the rule except deterrence. To suggest that a damage remedy can ef-
fectively secure the public's right to be free from unlawful search is to strike a bal-
ance that conceivably could produce even greater confusion with regard to fourth
amendment rights, without a corresponding increase in police effectiveness. Deter-
rence can be effective only when the incentive to violate the individual's rights is
removed. A damage remedy would arguably fail to remove incentives for two rea-
sons. First is the likelihood that governments will accept the opportunity to "buy"
the right to breach fourth amendment prohibitions; second, a damage remedy to be
effective would necessarily have to be significant in amount and enforceable
against individual government personnel-creating the possibility of chilling good
faith law enforcement efforts. The exclusionary rule, on the other hand, is an ade-
quate mechanism to protect the fourth amendment by removing much of the incen-
tive for unlawful conduct. Moreover, in spite of the social costs involved in ap-
plying the rule, it is submitted that exclusion is the only viable instrument to se-
cure the fourth amendment against violations, which precludes judicial complicity
in constitutional invasions. In a system based upon respect for constitutional guar-
antees, such an ethical stance is compelled.
Hugh R. Whiting*
85 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 422-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Oaks, supra, note 21. For a complete discus-
sion of the judiciary's power to create remedies, as well as the argument that legislative supplant-
ing of the exclusionary rule may be unconstitutional, see Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies:
The Constitution As A Sword, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1532 (1972).
* Editorial Associate, Curtis A. Loveland.
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